We are very pleased to republish this important and extremely informative article by Michael Dunford, surveying and explaining China’s development path, 1949-2022. Michael, who is Emeritus Professor at Sussex University in the UK and a Visiting Professor at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, is also a member of our Advisory Group.
In his article, China’s path is conceived as a transition from an economically underdeveloped and semi-colonised country of the Global South into a modern socialist country in a multipolar world, where successive steps were shaped by China’s external environment and a succession of contradictions and crises encountered along the way.
Three phases are examined: a turbulent phase of socialist construction in a context of capital shortage and US embargoes; a phase of reform and opening up in an era of neoliberal globalisation, whose early roots lay in the early 1970s’ rapprochement with the US; and a New Era, dating essentially from Xi Jinping’s election as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. In each phase, Michael argues, crises and contradictions saw waves of reform, involving successive joint transformations of economic structures and institutions, while each phase was anticipated in the years that preceded it, so opening up actually started in the early 1970s with the rapprochement with the US, and aspects of the New Era, concerned with innovation, green development, common prosperity and an equitable global order, also started to emerge earlier.
For example, the New Era was anticipated as early as the start of the new millennium, when reform and opening up continued, yet with greater attention to the goal of ‘common prosperity’ and the correction of all kinds of imbalances and contradictions associated with the reform era. In addition, it was shaped by a changing international environment in which the US and its allies sought, and are still seeking, to prevent the return of China and ensure continuing US global dominance and control.
This interpretation challenges the notion that the events set in motion at the very end of 1978 amounted to an ideological change of course, not least as the opening to Western capital and integration into world markets dated from at least the early 1970s and were, in fact, envisaged in the years up to 1949. Second, it challenges common negative assessments of the first 30 years of the New China and, indeed, sees them as laying the foundations for later developments in an overall transition to socialism. Third, it emphasises the significance of successive reforms designed to address internal and external contradictions. Fourth, it suggests that the entire path is connected with earlier phases laying the foundations for later phases and with reforms at each stage addressing contradictions generated at earlier stages.
The article notes that Deng Xiaoping repeatedly argued that:
“Predominance of public ownership and common prosperity are the two fundamental socialist principles that we must adhere to. The aim of socialism is to make all our people prosperous, not to create polarisation. If our policies led to polarisation, it would mean that we had failed; if a new bourgeoisie emerged, it would mean that we had strayed from the right path. In encouraging some regions to become prosperous first, we intend that they should inspire others to follow their example and that all of them should help economically backward regions to develop. The same holds good for some individuals.”
Michael then goes on to argue that in the first three decades of reform and opening up, China achieved sustained high rates of GDP growth, but the priority attached to increases in GDP and letting some get rich first was responsible for a series of negative consequences: serious environmental damage, resource depletion, growing inequalities in income and wealth, growing rural–urban and regional disparities, increasing corruption, and a rapid increase in mass incidents relating to employment, land acquisition, demolitions, pollution and official conduct. Addressing these issues from around the turn of the millennium, in 1998, the party leadership took up issues of greatest concern to farmers and, the next year, China’s western development was set in motion to expand domestic demand and drive economic growth in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, and to contribute to ‘common prosperity’. Measures to support North-east and Central China followed.
In conclusion, Michael observes that the new China that emerged from a semi-colonial state and civil war in 1949 was one of the poorest countries in the world. As of today, it is an upper-middle-income country that has lifted all of its 1.4 billion people out of extreme poverty. In terms of material production, it is the largest economy in the world, and as a global actor, it envisages a new international order centred on the equality and sovereignty of all nations, and their right to choose their own development paths.
China’s own progress is a result of: a socialist model that is people- rather than capital-centred and in which politics (what is called ‘Chinese whole-process democracy’) rather than capital rules; avoidance of debt-traps that afflict many developing countries; its ability to preserve its sovereignty in an unjust and unequal world; its capacity to effectively mobilise the energy of its people; and its ability to maintain high rates of investment to drive catch-up industrialisation, urbanisation and rural–urban co-evolution.
China emerged from the turbulent Mao era with a core sovereign socialist industrial system, a doubling of life expectancy, an immense young, healthy and educated population, and a high degree of equity. After relations with the US improved, China embarked on reform and opening up under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping to accelerate the development of the productive forces and allowed some people and places to get rich first in the expectation that others would get rich later. Although almost everyone’s livelihood improved overall (though not at certain times and in certain places), a dramatic growth in inequality and serious environmental and social problems, as well as a need to innovate and reduce reliance on low-wage and low-skilled industries, caused China to address more strongly the goals of common prosperity, green development and economic modernisation. Between 2013–20, it successfully completed an extraordinary campaign to end extreme poverty. At the same time, modernisation goals involve a commitment to more measured and higher-quality development, and scientific, technological and industrial upgrading. In the New Era, however, China is also seeking to identify a distinctive Chinese path to modernisation, that is innovative, ecological, spiritually rich and equitable, and that enriches the lives of all of its people.
This thoroughly researched and detailed article deserves to be studied carefully and widely discussed. It was originally published in the journal Global Discourse.
Abstract
China’s path is conceived as a transition of an economically under-developed and semi-colonised country of the Global South into a modern socialist country in a multipolar world where successive steps (modes of regulation) were shaped by China’s external environment (uneven and combined development) and a succession of contradictions and crises encountered along the way. Three phases are examined: a turbulent phase of socialist construction in a context of capital shortage and United States (US) embargoes, a phase of reform an opening up in an era of neo-liberal globalisation whose early roots lay in early 1970s rapprochement with the US, and a New Era dating from 2017. In each phase crises and contradictions saw waves of reform involving successive joint transformations of economic structures and institutions, while each phase was anticipated in the years that preceded it, so opening-up started in the early 1970s with the rapprochement with the US and aspects of the New Era concern with innovation, green development, common prosperity and an equitable global order started to emerge earlier.
1 Introduction
China is one of the world’s most ancient civilizations marked by the reproduction of recognizable Chinese social, political and cultural characteristics. These characteristics were shaped by several thousand years of dynastic and imperial rule, by earlier socio-political orders made up of an ocean of local rural communities centred around patriarchal families, a single centre of political power and hierarchical administrations occasionally removed as a result of the loss of the Mandate of Heaven (expressing the dependence of the political legitimacy of ruling elites on the consent and wellbeing of the great majority of the Chinese people) and by Confucian, Daoist, Buddhist, Legalist and more recently Marxist values and thought that exercise important influences to this day.
Until the Eighteenth Century, China was a world leader in science and technology. In 1750 it accounted for 32.8% of world manufactures. By 1860, however, its share had declined to just 19.7%, and, by 1913, it was a mere 3.6% (Bairoch 1997: volume 3, p. 860). In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries neither the crisis-ridden Qing (Manchu) Dynasty nor the post-2011 Nationalist (Guomindang) governments managed to overcome the obstacles to industrial modernization, and the devastating impacts of the military, political and commercial penetration of China by foreign colonial powers and of Japan’s attempt at conquest. In more than one hundred years of humiliation, China was forced to sign unequal treaties, cede sovereignty and territorial rights to nineteen foreign powers and pay huge financial indemnities, while its real GDP per capita declined from 2011 US$ 926 in 1800 to 439 in 1950 (Bolt and van Zanden 2020).
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