Economics Archives - Friends of Socialist China

China’s strategic approach to food security versus Britain’s ‘Dad’s Army’ embarrassment

The following article is the text of the Daily Briefing for October 23 published by Common Weal, which contrasts the British government’s Be Ready campaign to China’s approach to food security.

The article begins by noting: “There is a strong argument to be made that the call today for households to stockpile essentials in case of emergency represents the final failure of our society, of our economic model and of our place in the world. Government is calling for all citizens to take the task of national security into their own hands. Rather than seeing it as a purpose of government to ensure food security, it is to be left to us.”

It continues: “By comparison, while China keeps its strategic food reserves secretive, they are massive. We don’t know exactly how big they are, but we know that its rice reserves constitute more than half of the total global reserves. It has massive frozen pork reserves as well. China uses these reserves for three purposes; to ensure food security, to manage the food production economy and to manage prices… China has double food security because it has managed domestic production to ensure it can meet its own needs and it has reserves in case of interruption in supply.

“In Britain we’re being asked to clear out some space at the back of the cupboard to keep some tins of beans. The flaws in this plan are immense. For a start, many people do not have adequate storage space to make themselves food secure in the event of an emergency. And then of course a lot of people are struggling to feed themselves today never mind also store for the future… our economic model is now so broken and the theories of free market economics so destructive to us individually that there is a genuine risk that outcome of ‘never interfere in the market’ is widespread death.”

Common Weal describes itself as a people-powered ‘think and do’ tank in Scotland. “We seek to promote thinking, practice and campaigning on a wide range of social, economic and cultural areas. Some of our biggest issues are social and economic equality, participative democracy, environmental sustainability, wellbeing, quality of life, peace, justice and cooperation. We are not affiliated to any political party but work in partnership with a wide range of organisations.”

“In China, I saw the future”

In the following article, Zhou Lin reports on the Mingde Strategic Dialogue (2026), held at Beijing’s Renmin University on October 11, themed “Resilience and Vitality: New Opportunities China’s Development Brings to the World”. This capped a visit by a delegation of more than 20 former political leaders and renowned scholars from 10 countries – Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Britain, Canada, Ethiopia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia and the United States – to Shanghai, Xinyu in Jiangxi province, and Wenzhou in Zhejiang province. They held in-depth discussions on such topics as China’s high-quality development and global economic growth, improving global economic governance, safeguarding the stability of industrial and supply chains, and AI-enabled industrial innovation, and arrived at conclusions that stand in sharp contrast to the “Peak China” narrative.

George Galloway, former British MP and leader of the Workers Party of Britain, said that he was deeply impressed by the high-end “hand-tearable steel” produced by Xinyu Iron & Steel, just 0.08 millimetres thick. “The steel they make there is so thin that a person can tear it apart by hand,” he said. “China is in a leading position in many industrial fields, a lead that is arguably almost unsurpassable.” In his view, while many European countries are experiencing social disorder or changes of government, China is one of the few places in the world today enjoying stability and prosperity. The West’s labelling of Chinese exports as “overcapacity,” together with its tariff barriers, is protectionism in substance – a departure from the principles of free trade.

Jennifer Shipley, former prime minister of New Zealand, attributed the resilience of the Chinese economy to long-term planning and strategic resolve. China’s economic resilience and vitality, she said, stem from its commitment to long-term planning, sustained infrastructure development, continuous scientific and technological innovation, and constant strategic adjustment in response to changing circumstances.

Mulatu Teshome, former president of Ethiopia, argued that China’s innovation in green technology, advanced manufacturing, and the digital economy has not only driven its own transformation and upgrading, but also injected new momentum into the world economy. This has created favourable conditions for Africa and other developing regions to expand trade channels and promote industrial development.

Glenn Diesen, a professor at the University of South-Eastern Norway, said that as hegemony declines, the once US-centred international economic system is rapidly being replaced by one of neo-mercantilism, in which technology blockades, financial sanctions, and the control of key corridors have been weaponised. Rebuilding trust in supply chains and financial architecture, he argued, must rely on multipolarity and multilateralism – and mechanisms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are becoming key forces for pluralistic balance and multilateral cooperation worldwide.

The article concludes: “For the members of the foreign delegation, the visit’s deepest impression is perhaps best summed up in Galloway’s words: ‘In China, I saw the future.’”

Sanders, Bannon and an AI ban aimed at China

The following important article by Gary Wilson brings a much-needed class analysis to bear on the debate over AI safety, artificial general intelligence and recursive self-improvement – an issue that has until now been conducted almost entirely in the abstract language of “humanity versus the machines”.

Gary’s starting point is a one-day Pro-Human Assembly held in Washington on 15 September, at which Senator Bernie Sanders shared a platform with Steve Bannon, and at which Sanders and Congressman Greg Casar promoted their proposed Ban Artificial Superintelligence Act. The question posed from that stage was how to keep artificial intelligence under human control. But, as Wilson observes, there is no “human control” in general: every one of the leading AI systems is owned by somebody, financed by somebody and put to work by somebody.

Artificial superintelligence does not exist. What does exist is Palantir’s Maven Smart System, running on a Pentagon contract worth nearly $1.3 billion and used to identify and prioritise targets in the war on Iran; Palantir’s ELITE, which assigns confidence scores to addresses where ICE may find the people it is hunting; and the algorithmic systems already used across warehousing, construction, transport, healthcare and gig work to set the pace of work, evaluate performance and determine pay. None of these is the target of the proposed ban.

The article argues that the core target of the current debate is China. Gary traces the convergence between Sanders’ call for export controls and international agreement, Bannon’s demand that Chinese nationals be removed from US laboratories, and Anthropic chief executive Dario Amodei’s proposal for an industry slowdown that must on no account go far enough to let Chinese companies catch up – noting the obvious contradiction that the US companies built their models by appropriating the accumulated labour of millions of people without permission or payment, and now want the US government to stop Chinese companies doing to them what they did to everyone else.

The machines already have human owners.

The most advanced chips are owned. The data centers are owned. The models are owned. The military networks are owned and controlled by the government. The products of millions of people’s labor have been gathered into privately owned systems whose owners determine who may use them and for what purpose.

Now those same corporations and the U.S. government are arguing over how fast those systems should develop, how tightly they should be regulated and how to keep China from acquiring the same capabilities.

The machines that ought to worry us already have names, budgets and contracts.

Maven sorts targets.

ELITE sorts addresses.

They are under the control of the U.S. monopolies and the U.S. government. The ban proposed in Washington would leave both running. Its target is China.

China’s photovoltaic power capacity overtakes coal-fired power for first time

Solar is now China’s single largest power source by installed capacity. The country’s installed photovoltaic capacity reached 1,286 gigawatts at the end of July, overtaking coal for the first time. PV now accounts for over 30 percent of total installed capacity, and represents more than 40 percent of capacity added in 2026.

To give a frame of comparison: China’s solar capacity alone is now around ten times Britain’s entire generating capacity, from all sources. Under the current five-year plan, another 2,800 gigawatts of renewable capacity is to be integrated by 2030 – roughly double the whole installed capacity of the United States.

Note that installed capacity is not the same as generation. Solar produced 802.4 billion kilowatt-hours from January to July, which is 13 percent of China’s electricity consumption. Liu Zhiqiang of the China Electricity Council notes that PV is intermittent and volatile, that its utilisation hours are far below coal’s, and that “in the short term, coal-fired power will remain a major source of support for the power system in China”.

However, China is working rapidly on technological innovation, and plans to generate around 6 trillion kilowatt-hours of renewable energy annually by 2030, with over 4 trillion from wind and solar, alongside integrated PV-storage systems and PV hydrogen production.

The trajectory is clear. Coal supplied around 80 percent of China’s electricity at the start of this century. It fell below 50 percent of output in the first half of this year. Carbon emissions appear to have peaked in 2023, some seven years ahead of target.

The global significance of this is profound. China manufactures over 80 percent of the world’s solar modules and 70 percent of its wind equipment. That industrial scale is why the cost of renewable energy globally is a fraction of what it was 15 years ago. This collapse in price is the single most important factor making decarbonisation viable for much of the Global South.

Cuba, under an illegal blockade and suffering daily blackouts, has installed around 1,000 megawatts of Chinese solar in two years. Zambia is getting a solar plant with battery storage in every one of its 156 constituencies. Africa’s clean energy boom runs on Chinese equipment.

Meanwhile, the US is dismantling its clean energy industry while ramping up drilling. Britain is opening new North Sea fields. The EU imposes tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and solar panels that could help cut its emissions.

China’s remarkable progress in renewable energy is the product of long-term state direction, sustained public investment and the deliberate construction of a complete industrial chain over two decades – that is, the things Western journalists and politicians consistently denounce as distortion and overcapacity.

A global energy transition is being made possible by Chinese socialism.

Michael Roberts: WAPE 2026 – Adam Smith, imperialism and financialisation

The following report by the Marxist economist Michael Roberts covers the 19th Congress of the World Association of Political Economy (WAPE), held at the University of Greenwich in London – a Chinese-initiated academic body that brings together Marxist economists from across the world.

This year’s theme was Adam Smith, 250 years after the publication of The Wealth of Nations. WAPE chair Cheng Enfu of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argued that Smith has been badly misrepresented by the free-marketeers who claim him: he explained modern economies not through markets alone but through the social division of labour, moral norms and the role of the state. Several papers were devoted to rescuing Smith from neoliberalism. But as Cheng also noted, Smith’s labour theory of value was contradictory – he held that labour creates value while also reverting to a theory based on “factors of production”, and it is the latter that modern mainstream economics kept and the former that it discarded.

Roberts’s own paper, on imperialist exploitation, concludes that under imperialism the poor countries of the world will never close the gap with the Global North – with one exception. On present trends, no BRICS country will reach the current high-income level within twenty years except China, which he projects will get there by 2041 and match the projected rich-country level by 2046. His explanation is that value is persistently transferred from South to North, and that profitability across the Global South is falling faster than productivity is rising, choking off investment. China is the exception because its investment growth is less determined by profitability than that of any other major Global South economy – which is to say, because it is a socialist country with a planned core.

Roberts was also presented with a WAPE award for his significant contribution to Marxian economics.

The antibiotics crisis and the case for socialism

Ara Darzi – surgeon, Labour peer and author of the 2024 review of the NHS – has written in the Financial Times that the West has handed China “the keys to the medicine cabinet”, warning of the “peacetime weaponisation” of pharmaceutical supply chains. China supplies around 94 percent of the key raw materials for amoxicillin and nearly half of global antibiotic ingredient exports.

The following article by Carlos Martinez takes the sinophobic framing apart. China has never withheld medicine from anyone, while the United States is currently obstructing medical supplies to Cuba, Iran and Venezuela, and held up ventilator and PPE shipments during a pandemic. However, what Darzi concedes along the way is of interest.

Darzi’s own diagnosis is that antibiotics are a permanent market failure: a drug whose value rises the less it is used cannot recoup its research costs, so Novartis, AstraZeneca and Sanofi have all quit the field, and the company that brought a new antibiotic to market in 2018 was bankrupt within a year. As former British Chief Medical Officer Sally Davies put it, a medicine that cures you in a week is a worse business proposition than one you must take for life. Meanwhile some 4.71 million deaths were associated with antibacterial resistance in 2021, with the heaviest burden falling on South and Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa – precisely where the market is least likely to step in.

Darzi’s conclusion is that antibiotics should be treated not as a commodity but as critical infrastructure, planned and publicly supported. The article agrees, and observes that when China applies exactly that logic – to antibiotics, solar panels, batteries, electric vehicles, high-speed rail or semiconductors – it is denounced as overcapacity and distortion, and met with tariffs. Darzi has written a very persuasive argument for socialism, and appears not to have noticed.

Former premier Zhu Rongji passes away

Former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji, a key architect of China’s economic reforms and of the country’s transition to a socialist market economy, died of illness on August 12 at the age of 98.

Zhu had served as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 14th and 15th Central Committees of the Communist Party of China (CPC). An official obituary extolled him as an excellent Party member, a time-tested and loyal communist fighter, and an outstanding proletarian revolutionist, statesman and leader of the Party and the state.

Zhu was born in October 1928 in Changsha, Hunan Province. He studied in the Department of Electrical Engineering at Tsinghua University from 1947 to 1951. He joined the CPC in October 1949.

In March 1998, he was appointed premier of the State Council. Facing the impact of the Asian financial crisis and the catastrophic flooding in China, he implemented the plans of the Party Central Committee to shift from a moderately tight fiscal and monetary policy to a proactive fiscal policy and a prudent monetary policy, expand domestic demand and deepen reforms in key areas, thereby sustaining steady and rapid economic growth.

Whilst a staunch proponent of economic reform, Zhu was always deeply concerned about the immediate as well as the long-term interests of the working class and the majority of the people.

He worked to establish the basic living security system for laid-off workers from state-owned enterprises, the unemployment insurance system, and the minimum living guarantee system for urban residents. He also made great efforts to address issues such as wage arrears and the re-employment of laid-off workers.

The obituary stressed that Zhu had deep affection for the people. He emphasised that government officials must always bear in mind that they are public servants and should have the courage to speak the truth, not fear giving offence, and refrain from seeking special privileges. He also stressed the need to take the initiative, with a strong sense of responsibility, to shoulder heavy burdens, take on tough problems and go all out to deliver real results for the people.

After retiring from leadership posts, he steadfastly upheld and supported the CPC Central Committee with Hu Jintao as general secretary, and then the CPC Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core. He continued to care about the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics and firmly supported efforts to improve conduct, promote integrity and fight corruption.

The obituary concludes that Zhu’s life was a revolutionary, fighting and glorious one. His death is a great loss to the Party and the state.

China’s exports support Global South development

In the following article, which was originally published by the South China Morning Post and is reproduced here from the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) in Beijing, Zhou Xiaoming takes issue with western narratives that allege that China’s exports are stifling the development of the rest of the Global South. On the contrary, he argues that China’s export portfolio constitutes a positive-sum diffusion of industrial growth.

Zhou enjoins us to “look at the sector where you would expect the fiercest head-to-head competition – labour-intensive consumer goods. If China were truly monopolising the export space of others, its share would be stable or climbing. In reality, it is falling. China’s share of global garment exports fell to just under 30 per cent in 2024, a significant drop from its peak of over 40 per cent about a decade ago.”

China, he continues, “is not shipping goods to outcompete Global South producers; it is shipping the building blocks that make factories viable. According to an Oxford Economics report, nearly half of China’s total exports are intermediate goods – components and raw materials that feed into other countries’ production lines rather than finished products for consumers.

“Take Southeast Asia. Customs data from the first half of 2026 shows China’s intermediate goods exports to Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states rocketed 24.5 per cent year on year to 2.86 trillion yuan. These kinds of inputs help Vietnamese electronics assemblers, Thai auto-part makers and Malaysian chip packagers produce and export their own finished goods. This is deep integration.”

He continues: “Beyond components, there are capital goods. China’s enabling role also comes into play here. For decades, a major barrier to industrialisation was the staggering cost of capital equipment. Today, Chinese-made industrial machinery is dramatically more affordable… As Chinese capital and equipment are building industrial capacity across the Global South, China is turning itself into the ‘mother machine’ of the industrialising world, transforming technology and production know-how that Western development aid never delivered.”

He concedes that, “Yes, China runs surpluses with multiple developing nations. But look closer. Take Vietnam for instance. Its 2025 trade deficit with China stood at around US$115 billion. Yet imports of capital and intermediate goods tell the real story. In 2025, capital goods such as computers, electronics, and machinery accounted for over half of its total imports. Vietnam’s deficit is a receipt for industrialisation.”

Whilst, “we are witnessing a historic reorganisation of global production – one that offers developing nations their first genuine shot at industrialisation without waiting for Western handouts… China’s exports pose a challenge to sectors such as automobile and home appliances in South Africa and Brazil. However, China’s exports are primarily the scaffolding on which other Global South countries are erecting their own industrial futures. Tear that scaffolding down, as some want, and you deprive scores of developing economies of a route out of underdevelopment.”

He also reminds us to look at imports: “China is the top export destination for 79 countries and regions. In May, it expanded its zero-tariff import policy to 53 African countries. Painting China as a threat to development ignores how Beijing is widening its doors to products from the Global South.”

He concludes: “Western critiques are rather paternalistic, assuming developing nations are passive victims, incapable of making rational choices about their own trade relationships. That condescension, echoing the ‘white man’s burden’, is the real obstacle to the Global South’s prosperity.”

British Steel or British Steal?

In July, the British government completed the full nationalisation of British Steel – a move welcomed by the country’s trade unions, and one socialists have no reason to oppose in principle. But as Carlos Martinez argues in the following article, what took place was not simply the homecoming of a strategic industry. It was the expropriation of the Chinese firm that Britain itself invited in to rescue that industry six years ago, and which invested upwards of £1.2 billion doing so.

Comparing the treatment of Jingye Group with the £500 million subsidy handed to India’s Tata Steel for an almost identical transition at Port Talbot, he argues that this is a story about China rather than about steel – part of a wider pattern that takes in the seizure of Nexperia in the Netherlands, the forced sale of TikTok in the United States and the blocking of Chinese rare-earth investment in Australia. Nationalisation, he concludes, need not be reversed; it needs to be completed honestly, with prompt and adequate compensation, and with China engaged as the obvious partner for the green transformation Scunthorpe needs.

Why the Western left misreads China: capitalism, imperialism, and the socialist difference

In the following article, Karim Pourhamzavi – an Iranian lecturer specialising in global political economy and West Asian and North African politics at Beijing Foreign Studies University – takes aim at a strand of Western left thinking that treats Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and US capitalism as equivalent. Drawing on the history of capitalism, imperialism and uneven development, he argues that there is no equivalence in power between imperialism and its victims, even when the victim is a rising power like China.

Because the commanding heights of China’s economy remain in public ownership and its socialist state answers to the people rather than to the market, he contends, China is structurally incapable of the imperialism that has defined the West for five centuries – which is why, for the Global South, China’s rise represents the most constructive development since the birth of capitalism.

I recently attended a conference on the critique of global capitalism and possible global reordering in a renowned European city. My paper focused on critiquing imperialism and its expansion in West Asia. However, several presentations from European and North American scholars were unnecessarily and inaccurately Sinophobic in sentiment. Their thesis was astonishingly simplistic: capitalism is just capitalism, whether practiced by the United States or China. Therefore, they believed both are equally exploitative and destructive. This thesis suffers from both epistemological and empirical flaws. Such Sinophobic interpretations, coming from significant sections of the Western left, appear to abandon their emancipatory methodologies aimed at “changing” the world for the better, instead losing themselves in a positivist interpretation of the world. Yet there is no equivalence in power relations – or even sameness – between imperialism and its victims, even when the victim is a rising power like China.

Capitalism is not a universal condition

The aforementioned claims came from scholars in a city whose infrastructure is at least fifty years behind that of Beijing, where I live. These scholars have often never visited China, nor do they intend to, and they possess an ahistorical understanding of the Chinese political economy. Understanding socialism with Chinese characteristics requires revisiting the very term “capitalism.” Capitalism strictly refers to a political-economic system that emerged in Western Europe and expanded by imperial means to the Americas – precisely from 1492 onward. By the early 20th century, some 85 percent of the world’s land surface was under the colonial or semi-colonial domination of the Western powers and Japan. Therefore, China, like the rest of what we now understand as the Global South, was forcibly incorporated into global capitalism – compelled to cope with the enforced uneven development resulting from this historical process and to clean up the mess it left behind, a legacy that persists to this day.

Therefore, China’s modern history is not one experienced by the developed capitalist nations. Nor, at the philosophical and developmental planning levels, does revolutionary China share similarities with the core of capitalism or with those unevenly developed states that unsuccessfully tried to copy them as a way out of their underdevelopment. The first three hundred years of capitalist plundering in the world were based on a mercantilist political economy. This system sought to take everything from conquered nations and leave them nothing, while maintaining a balance of power among European rivals. It was centuries of plundering that enabled the Industrial Revolution – first in England, and then across the rest of Western Europe.

Should China “lessen the role of the state”?

In the latest of the Financial Times’ periodic lectures to Beijing on how to run its economy, the Brookings Institution’s Eswar Prasad urges China to reduce its reliance on public investment, move away from manufacturing and – above all – “lessen the role of the state”. In the following article, Friends of Socialist China co-editor Carlos Martinez takes the prescriptions in turn.

He finds them to be not a serious diagnosis but an invitation to dismantle the socialist foundations of the most successful economic development in human history, in favour of a model that is visibly failing the countries that practise it.

Every so often the Financial Times publishes its periodic instruction to China on how to run its economy. The latest comes from Eswar Prasad of the Brookings Institution, and it follows the established template: concede the achievements in a subordinate clause, then explain that catastrophe looms unless Beijing adopts the policy mix of the countries currently growing at a third of its rate.

China, we learn, is “in serious trouble” – while growing at about 4.3 percent, a figure no G7 economy has come close to in years, and roughly double the US rate. Inflation has turned positive after a deflationary spell; industrial profits are rebounding. In any other country this would be reported as a soft landing. For China it is presented as calm concealing catastrophe.

Let us take the prescriptions in turn.

First, China must “reduce reliance on public investment and exports”.

But since around 78 percent of China’s growth derives from capital inputs, cutting investment means cutting growth. This is simply the United States inviting China to engage in economic self-harm. Public investment is the key mechanism through which China has built its infrastructure, energy, transport and industrial base. It is also the mechanism through which it has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty. And it is the mechanism through which it has built a high-tech economy that now competes with, and even out strips, the West across the board.

As the Marxist economist Michael Roberts has repeatedly shown, it is high levels of productive investment, not the debt-fuelled consumption favoured in the West, that drive sustained growth and rising living standards over time – exactly the relationship mainstream commentary is determined to invert.

On exports, trade accounted for about 20 percent of China’s growth in 2025; the rest came from domestic consumption and investment. Household consumption, meanwhile, grew at 4.4 percent, in line with GDP. The claim that China free-rides on foreign demand is simply not what the data shows.

China’s open-weight AI exposes the fiction behind Wall Street’s boom

The following article by Gary Wilson, an editor of the US socialist newspaper Struggle – La Lucha, offers a sharp Marxist reading of the summer’s turmoil in AI stocks – and of why the release of powerful open-weight models by Chinese firms has sent such a shock through Wall Street.

In July, the arrival of Moonshot AI’s Kimi K3 and DeepSeek’s V4 – open-weight models matching the strongest systems from Anthropic, OpenAI and Google – triggered the worst week for US chip stocks in over a year and briefly cost Nvidia its crown as the world’s most valuable company. Wilson argues that the panic exposed the hollowness of the whole AI boom, which rests not on profits already earned but on the promise that a handful of US corporations will exercise a monopoly over the technology and charge the world a toll for every use.

Drawing on Marx’s concept of fictitious capital, he shows how a thin layer of real income has been made to support a towering mass of debt and inflated valuations – with AI-linked firms now accounting for around 40 percent of the value of the S&P 500. Open-weight models threaten to make the assumed monopoly impossible, which is why Washington is turning from market competition to coercion, deploying export controls and national-security pretexts to defend a monopoly that competition has in reality already broken.

Against this, the article counterposes the vision set out by Xi Jinping in Shanghai – of AI developed openly as a shared asset of humanity – and the material foundation, created by the 1949 Revolution, that allows China to direct investment towards public use rather than private rent.

Las reformas económicas de Cuba y las perspectivas de la renovación socialista

We are pleased to republish below the Spanish translation, by the progressive Chilean journal El Ciudadano, of Carlos Martinez’s recent article, Cuba’s economic reforms and the prospects for socialist renewal.

El siguiente artículo analiza las transformaciones más profundas del modelo económico cubano en más de seis décadas: un programa compuesto por 23 ejes estratégicos y 176 medidas, aprobado por unanimidad este mes por la Asamblea Nacional.

Buena parte de la prensa occidental, así como un sector importante de la izquierda en Occidente, se ha apresurado a presentar estas reformas como el momento en que el bloqueo finalmente consiguió quebrar a la Revolución. Carlos sostiene exactamente lo contrario. A su juicio, las reformas deben entenderse como una estrategia de defensa del socialismo bajo condiciones de asedio, inspirada en la lógica que ha guiado a China desde 1978: el empleo regulado de los mecanismos de mercado y de la inversión extranjera para desarrollar las fuerzas productivas, mientras el Partido Comunista conserva el poder político y la propiedad pública de los sectores estratégicos de la economía. Como señala el especialista en Cuba Isaac Saney, estas medidas, «lejos de representar un retroceso», constituyen «un esfuerzo estratégico por preservar y profundizar las conquistas sociales de la Revolución».

El artículo sitúa las reformas en el contexto de un cerco sin precedentes impuesto por Estados Unidos: 64 años de bloqueo, recrudecido bajo Trump y Rubio, con el suministro de combustible prácticamente estrangulado y apagones de hasta veinte horas diarias. Asimismo, recorre las dos últimas décadas de reformas graduales emprendidas por Cuba, desde los Lineamientos impulsados por Raúl Castro hasta la Zona Especial de Desarrollo Mariel, concebida deliberadamente siguiendo las experiencias de China y Vietnam. La cuestión decisiva, sostiene Carlos, es la misma que distinguió las reformas de Beijing de la perestroika de Gorbachov: ¿quién conserva el poder político? Cuba, argumenta, está recorriendo la senda de la reforma y apertura china, no la vía soviética de la perestroika; y la solidaridad de China —expresada en la cooperación energética, alimentaria y en las relaciones entre ambos partidos comunistas— puede resultar determinante.

En palabras del presidente Miguel Díaz-Canel: «No hay soberanía con un plato vacío». Y también: «No nos vamos a reunir solamente para resistir. Nos vamos a reunir para crear. Para producir. Para decidir. Para controlar. Para prosperar y para transformar».

SCO debates sovereign financial infrastructure for the Global South

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) – which now represents some 42 percent of the world’s population – is increasingly turning its attention to building financial infrastructure independent of the US dollar. At a forum held on the sidelines of the 14th World Peace Conference in Beijing, officials and analysts from Iran, Russia, China, Belarus and Uzbekistan debated how the bloc might construct alternative settlement mechanisms capable of insulating its members from Washington’s unilateral sanctions.

The context is the growing use of sanctions as a weapon of economic warfare against independent states – Iran, Russia, Belarus, Venezuela and Cuba among them. As the following report from Press TV explains, the proposals under discussion build on an initiative advanced by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian at the SCO’s Tianjin summit: expanding trade in national currencies, developing secure digital infrastructure for cross-border payments, and establishing a multilateral swap fund to cushion members against financial shocks.

For its proponents, such a system is about more than evading sanctions. It is about establishing a sovereign financial architecture for the Global South – one that would allow nations to decouple from Western financial hegemony and conduct their trade, investment and development on their own terms. It is a further sign of the emerging multipolar order.

Why the Chinese working class won’t pay for Western neoliberalism

The following article by Carlos Martinez responds to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s call at the recent EU summit for a new “Plaza Accord” to force up the value of the Chinese renminbi.

Carlos recalls how the original 1985 Plaza Accord was not a neutral rebalancing of trade but the deliberate kneecapping of an economic competitor – Washington strong-arming Japan, West Germany, France and Britain into driving down the dollar, plunging Japan into a “lost decade” of stagnation while failing to dent a US trade deficit that originated in Washington’s own model of high consumption and low savings, not in the exchange rate.

Carlos argues that China today cannot be treated as Japan was. Where Japan was a subordinate Cold War ally hosting tens of thousands of US troops; China is a sovereign socialist state with an increasingly prosperous domestic market of 1.4 billion people, an independent financial policy and a central bank that answers to no one in the West – it simply cannot be “Plaza’d”.

The article also takes aim at the language of “overcapacity”, which Carlos describes as a euphemism for European and North American industry failing to compete after nearly half a century of financialisation, privatisation and deregulation. Chinese competitiveness in electric vehicles, batteries and solar panels flows from a complete industrial system and sustained investment in technology – not from currency manipulation – and the EU’s tariffs of up to 35 per cent on Chinese electric vehicles are, he writes, “an act of self-harm disguised as self-defence”.

Cuba’s economic reforms and the prospects for socialist renewal

The following article by Carlos Martinez, co-editor of Friends of Socialist China and author of The East Is Still Red, examines the most far-reaching changes to Cuba’s economic model in more than 60 years – a programme of 23 strategic axes and 176 measures approved unanimously this month by the National Assembly.

Much of the Western press, and a good part of the Western left, has rushed to read the reforms as the moment the blockade finally broke the Revolution. Carlos argues the opposite: that they are best understood as a defence of socialism under siege, following the strategic logic China has pursued since 1978 – the controlled use of markets and foreign investment to develop the productive forces while the Communist Party retains political power and public ownership of the commanding heights. As the Cuba specialist Isaac Saney puts it, the measures, “far from representing a retreat”, constitute “a strategic effort to preserve and deepen the social gains of the Revolution”.

The article sets the reforms against the backdrop of an unprecedented US siege – 64 years of blockade, escalated under Trump and Rubio, with fuel choked off and blackouts of up to twenty hours a day – and traces Cuba’s two decades of gradual reform, from Raúl Castro’s “Guidelines” to the Mariel Special Economic Zone consciously modelled on China and Vietnam. The decisive question, Carlos insists, is the one that separated Beijing’s reforms from Gorbachev’s “perestroika”: who holds political power? Cuba, he argues, is travelling the road of China’s reform and opening up, not the Soviet road of perestroika – and China’s solidarity, in energy, food and party-to-party ties, may prove decisive.

In President Díaz-Canel’s words: “There is no sovereignty with an empty plate” – and “We are not going to come together only to resist. We are going to come together to create. To produce. To decide. To oversee. To prosper, and to transform.”

A version of this article, translated into Portuguese, can be found on Brasil de Fato.

China’s success vindicates the project of the global left

The video below is an interview of Carlos Martinez by Jason Smith, for CGTN’s The Bridge to China podcast. Recorded in the lead-up to the 105th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, the wide-ranging conversation covers the nature of China’s economic system, the achievements of Chinese socialism, the state of the left in the West, and the transition to a multipolar world.

Carlos argues that China is best understood on its own terms, as socialism with Chinese characteristics: a fundamentally socialist system with a significant market component, in which the state holds the commanding heights – banking, energy, telecommunications, rail and the top levels of industry – and directs investment through national planning. The presence of markets, billionaires or inequality does not make a country capitalist; what matters is which class holds power, and the ultimate measure is the living standards of ordinary working people.

On that measure, China stands apart: it is the country that has eliminated extreme poverty, effectively ended homelessness, and pursued common prosperity, a world-leading renewable energy build-out and the saving of lives during the Covid pandemic. If China is socialist and succeeding, Carlos contends, that vindicates the project of the global left – which is precisely why the West’s new cold war is aimed at preventing a socialist alternative from succeeding.

The interview surveys the scale of China’s transformation – some 800 million people lifted out of poverty, the “seven guarantees” that underpin poverty alleviation, life expectancy rising from around 35 at liberation to over 79 today, near-universal mortgage-free home ownership, and the most extensive public infrastructure in the world. Comparing China with India – liberated within two years of one another, from similar starting points – Carlos draws out what a revolution and Communist Party-led planning have made possible: sovereign development free of IMF discipline, coherent five-year plans, and the capacity for mass mobilisation, exemplified by the three million cadres deployed in the poverty alleviation campaign.

Turning to the West, Carlos describes the long retreat of the left under the neoliberal counter-revolution – de-industrialisation, the rise of the precariat, and a social peace bought with the super-profits of imperialism that are now drying up. He points to the crisis of confidence deepened by Gaza and to the Corbyn moment as signs that material reality is shifting, and to a growing openness to China – from “Chinamaxxing” and the RedNote migration to the surge in inbound tourism. The dogmatism that still leads much of the Western left to withhold recognition of China’s decidedly socialist achievements, he argues, plays into a US grand strategy whose core is the encirclement and containment of China.

The lesson for developed and developing countries alike, Carlos concludes, is that public ownership is not inefficient but the precondition for any serious industrial policy, that long-term planning beats short-term shareholder value, and that the West must come to terms with an inevitably multipolar world – starting, at a minimum, with adherence to the United Nations Charter.

Nissan, Chery and the case for cooperation with China

In early June 2026, the Financial Times reported that Nissan’s Sunderland plant – the UK’s largest car factory, employing 6,000 people – has secured its long-term future through a deal to manufacture vehicles for the Chinese carmaker Chery from 2027. In the following article, Friends of Socialist China co-editor Carlos Martinez argues that the agreement offers a concrete glimpse of a different economic path for Britain.

With Nissan’s global restructuring threatening thousands of jobs, and the motor industry’s own trade body admitting that Britain’s 2035 production targets are unreachable without Chinese manufacturers, Chinese industry is offering British workers what no British government has for forty years: high-quality jobs in a globally competitive, future-facing sector.

The predictable cries of ‘national security’ and ‘Chinese influence’, Martinez writes, are merely a manifestation of empire nostalgia. The real choice facing Britain is between embracing the multipolar transition or managing further decline in the service of a declining United States.

Jostein Hauge: This is why I’m Chinamaxxing

The following article by Jostein Hauge, political economist and an Associate Professor in Development Studies at the University of Cambridge, makes a clear and refreshing case for taking China’s achievements seriously. Hauge sets out the facts plainly – China’s unprecedented reduction of poverty, its leadership in clean energy, the scale and quality of its infrastructure, and its emergence as a counterweight to US hegemony – and insists that these gains are worth celebrating rather than treating, as so much Western commentary does, as a threat to be managed.

These are precisely the themes we explored in our recent webinar, Socialist Chinamaxxing: How China’s achievements are a product of its socialist system, which brought together speakers including George Galloway, Li Jingjing, Ben Norton, Danny Haiphong, Tings Chak, Chen Weihua, Ileana Chan, Keith Bennett and Qiao Collective to argue that China’s progress flows directly from its socialist system, and would not have been possible within a framework of capitalist rule.

We would, however, raise one friendly disagreement. Hauge writes that “China does not hold competitive national elections and practises considerable censorship”, and concludes that “China’s authoritarianism deserves real scrutiny”. In our view this concedes too much to the very liberal framework that the rest of his article so effectively challenges: the assumption that genuine democracy is defined by the Westminster parliamentary system, and that its absence amounts to “authoritarianism”.

This framing does not engage seriously with China’s socialist democracy. As we have argued, liberal democracy presents democracy as a purely procedural matter – periodic elections between rival capitalist parties – while obscuring the more fundamental question of which social class actually holds power. Meaningful democracy is not defined by what happens at the ballot box once every few years; it is about the ongoing participation of ordinary people in the running of society, and the degree to which the state is genuinely responsive to the needs of the majority. Measured this way – through its system of People’s Congresses combined with extensive structures of consultative democracy, and its consistent record of delivering for ordinary people – China’s socialist democracy can be considered to be more substantive than its Western counterparts, not less.

Xi Jinping has put the point sharply: a system in which “the people are awakened only at voting time and dormant afterward” is not true democracy.

Two railways, two systems: HS2 and the case for socialism

In the following article, originally published in the Morning Star, our co-editor Carlos Martinez uses the unfolding HS2 fiasco to illustrate the stark difference between the British and Chinese political economies, and to make the case for socialism.

On May 19, it was announced that Britain’s high-speed rail project will cost some £103 billion and will not carry passengers for at least another decade. Carlos sets these figures against China’s record: at roughly £736 million per mile, HS2 track is around 25 times more expensive than Chinese high-speed rail, and is being built at a fraction of the pace. China laid 31,000 miles of high-speed rail in 22 years; Britain may manage 140 miles in 19.

The explanation, Carlos argues, is not technical but political. Where China builds through vertically integrated state-owned enterprises under coordinated national planning, Britain’s project has been handed to a fragmented patchwork of private contractors, each adding its margin – the predictable result of four decades of privatisation and deindustrialisation.

The HS2 fiasco is not just a story about one botched railway project. It is a story, ultimately, about the fallacy of neoliberalism, about the consequences of four decades of deindustrialisation and privatisation, about the consequences of treating public infrastructure as an opportunity for private extraction rather than as a public good.

And it is a story about how, as Deng Xiaoping put it in 1984 (at the start of capitalism’s neoliberal era), “the superiority of the socialist system is demonstrated, in the final analysis, by faster and greater development of the productive forces than under the capitalist system.”

It was announced on May 19 that Britain’s ill-fated HS2 high-speed rail project is set to cost three times more than originally budgeted, and will not start running for at least another decade.

Transport Secretary Heidi Alexander stated that, following a review of the project, the estimated final cost will be £103 billion. What’s more, this only covers the first phase, between Old Oak Common (in west London) and Birmingham Curzon Street — a distance of 140 miles.

To put the figures in perspective: £103bn divided by 140 miles works out at around £736 million per mile. By comparison, the average cost of a mile of high-speed rail in China is in the region of £30m. HS2 track is therefore around 25 times more expensive than Chinese HSR.

The contrast in pace is if anything even more striking. Construction on HS2 began in 2017. If we see a train running in 2036, the pace of construction will have been a smidgen north of seven miles per year.