The article below, written by CJ Atkins for People’s World, analyses the recent Trump–Xi summit in Busan, South Korea, noting that while both leaders announced modest compromises – with the US easing tariffs and approving limited chip exports, and China resuming agricultural purchases and delaying rare earth export regulations – the meeting “represents a truce, not a treaty”.
The ambitions of the U.S. corporate oligarchy to derail China’s growth and hobble their competition have not been set aside. Nor have China’s desires to continue developing its economy and raising living standards for its 1.4 billion people… There is still a contest underway between the world’s biggest capitalist power and the world’s biggest socialist country, and the leaders of the two nations are following very different strategies as they seek to bring the rest of the globe onside.
To interpret this ongoing struggle, the article draws on Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s distinction between a “war of manoeuvre” and a “war of position.” A war of manoeuvre is a rapid, frontal assault to disrupt the status quo; a war of position is slower, focused on building long-term consensus and influence within institutions and public opinion. “Neither strategy was inherently right or wrong, Gramsci said; it was a matter of surveying the battlefield, so to speak, and determining which was appropriate given the political situation at the time.”
Trump’s trade war embodies the war of manoeuvre: abrupt tariffs, bans on technology exports, and pressure on allies to cut trade with China. His aim is to force quick concessions and signal dominance to domestic political supporters and corporate interests.
China by contrast is engaged in a war of position. The Chinese leadership emphasises cooperation, multilateralism, and shared prosperity. Rather than retaliating aggressively against the US’s unilateral measures, China strengthens regional institutions and trade networks – upgrading the China–ASEAN free-trade agreement, deepening APEC cooperation and upgrading trade partnerships. As a result, China is seen as a predictable and responsible global partner.
The article argues that Trump’s aggressive tactics have largely failed: US tariffs raised domestic inflation, damaged the agricultural sector, and highlighted China’s success over the course of recent years diversifying suppliers and trade partners. “By trying to enforce subservience to his demands, Trump’s strategy has actually generated further legitimacy for China’s model of multilateral cooperation in the eyes of much of the world.” CJ concludes:
Trump’s war of manoeuvre has depended on flashy claims and regular assurances of victories that are yet to materialise. But as China is showing in practice, and as Gramsci concluded in his Prison Notebooks, “In politics, the ‘war of position,’ once won, is decisive definitively.”
Fresh off his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, President Donald Trump hailed the summit as “amazing,” a “12” on a scale of 1 to 10. Xi’s assessment was also positive but more measured in tone. “In the face of winds, waves, and challenges,” he said, “we should stay the right course, navigate through the complex landscape, and ensure the steady sailing forward of the giant ship of China-U.S. relations.”
Headlines in the media, meanwhile, rattled off details of the agreements reached in Busan: A delay of Chinese rare earth export controls, the lowering of the U.S.’ supposedly fentanyl-linked tariff rates, the resumption of Chinese purchases of American soybeans, U.S. approval for the sale of some advanced microchips to Chinese firms, the mutual lowering of port fees, further talks about the future of TikTok, and more.
Continue reading War of position vs. war of manoeuvre: China’s Gramscian trade strategy