Law Archives - Friends of Socialist China

The KMT-CPC Meeting: Architecture of peace and global stability in a changing world

In April 2026, against the backdrop of a global crisis – most notably a criminal war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran that has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz and sent energy prices soaring to levels not seen in a generation – something highly significant took place in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing: President Xi Jinping met with Cheng Li-wun, Chairwoman of the Kuomintang (KMT), reopening a high-level cross-strait dialogue that had been frozen for nearly a decade (as reported on this website on 13 April).

The following article – submitted by Douglas de Castro, Professor of International Law at Lanzhou University – examines that meeting through the lens of international law, arguing that the CPC-KMT dialogue is a demonstration of what the UN Charter’s core principles – peaceful resolution of disputes, non-interference, sovereign equality – actually look like in practice.

Professor de Castro’s analysis unpacks the legal architecture of the meeting – from UNGA Resolution 2758 and the 1992 Consensus to China’s Anti-Secession Law and the Global Governance Initiative – and shows why the lessons of Cheng Li-wun’s visit extend well beyond the Taiwan Strait.

The meeting in April 2026 between President Xi Jinping, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, and Cheng Li-wun, the Chairwoman of the Kuomintang (KMT), was a historic moment in modern diplomacy. It took place during one of the most turbulent times in recent international relations history. This dialogue took place in the East Hall of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

As a scholar of international law, I found that the meeting not only reopened high-level communication channels between parties that had been closed for almost ten years but also demonstrated how the principle of non-interference and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, when applied in practice, can ease tensions in regions important to the international system. It upholds and reaffirms the importance of Articles 2(3) and 2(4) of the UN Charter, which require that disputes be settled peacefully and that no State threaten or use force against the territorial integrity of another State or region.

Why has China blocked Meta’s purchase of Manus AI?

When China’s National Development and Reform Commission ordered Meta to unwind its $2 billion acquisition of AI startup Manus on 27 April, Western media reached predictably for its standard toolkit: “authoritarian overreach”, “arbitrary intervention”, an assault on the “democratisation of technology.” What this framing systematically obscures is the substantive legal, strategic and political logic behind the decision.

The two pieces collected here provide that missing context. Sara Vivacqua’s investigation, published by the progressive Brazilian outlet Diário do Centro do Mundo and translated into English by the author, dissects both the legal architecture of China’s decision and the character of the company it rejected. Manus is not simply a commercial product; it is an autonomous AI agent – capable of operating inside authenticated platforms, accessing local sessions and executing complex multi-step tasks – built by Chinese engineers in China, with Chinese state support, before a hasty relocation to Singapore (presumably for purposes of regulatory evasion). The NDRC’s ruling establishes a clear and consequential precedent: jurisdictional control follows where technology is built and who builds it, not where a holding company is incorporated.

But Sara goes further, placing the ruling in the context of what Meta actually is. The company’s integration into US military AI development, its Llama models deployed across federal agencies and Five Eyes intelligence partners, its partnership with defence contractor Anduril, and its documented history of global electoral interference through the Cambridge Analytica scandal – all of this reframes the acquisition not as a business deal but as a potential intelligence operation. The question the Western press refuses to ask is the obvious one: why would any sovereign state hand strategic AI infrastructure to a company that functions as an arm of the US national security apparatus?

Below Sara Vivacqua’s article, we reproduce a Global Times editorial making the complementary case from a Chinese regulatory perspective: that the decision is legally grounded, internationally consistent, and entirely compatible with China’s continued openness to foreign investment in non-sensitive sectors. The EU, the US and Japan all operate comparable review mechanisms; the difference is that when China uses them, it is treated in the Western media as evidence of authoritarianism rather than ordinary statecraft.

Together, these two pieces offer what the mainstream coverage has failed to provide: a clear-eyed account of a decision that is legally sound and strategically coherent.

How China Blocked Zuckerberg’s Espionage Project with Manus AI

Meta, owned by Mark Zuckerberg and the parent company of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, found itself frustrated this Monday (27^th April) in its attempt to appropriate Chinese artificial intelligence technology.

The Yangtze River Protection Law as a model of ecological governance

The Yangtze River Protection Law (YPL), enacted on March 1, 2021, is China’s first comprehensive river-specific legislation and a landmark in the country’s environmental governance.

The following article, submitted by İbrahim Can Eraslan, describes how, rooted in the concept of ecological civilisation and the principle of harmony between humanity and nature, the YPL seeks to balance economic growth with ecological protection. It addresses decades of industrial, agricultural, and developmental pressures that have degraded the Yangtze River Basin, aiming to integrate ecological restoration, sustainable resource use, and coordinated governance.

Key measures of the law include permanent fishing bans in critical waters, regulation of sand mining, navigation controls in sensitive zones, pollution control, and biodiversity restoration. The YPL also prohibits relocating polluting industries upstream, restricts hazardous chemical transport, and protects shoreline and wetland ecosystems.

As is increasingly the case in China, the YPL embeds environmental protection into economic and land-use planning. By combining detailed statutory provisions, cross-agency cooperation, public oversight and adaptive planning, the YPL creates a model of environmental governance which not only advances China’s ecological modernisation but also offers a potential blueprint for Global South nations confronting similar development–environment tensions.

The author is a Turkish socialist and postgraduate student of Chinese Law and Governance at Tongji University, Shanghai.

As stated in Xi Jinping’s article “Green Mountains and Clean Waters are also Gold and Silver Mountains”, while economic development and growth are prioritized, the environment should not be sacrificed for these goals[i]. Again, in Xi Jinping’s 2017 keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, green development was emphasized[ii]. In the same speech, he called for strengthening cooperation in ecological and environmental protection and for building an ecological civilization while achieving the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Also in 2017, the Chinese government published the Guiding Opinions on Promoting Green Belt and Road Construction and the Belt and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan. From all of these, it can be understood that while the Communist Party of China emphasizes development, the principle of “harmony between humans and nature” is adopted as a guiding concept in China’s path to modernization.[iii]

In terms of these principles, the Yangtze River carries significant importance. Following China’s economic reforms, the rapid development of industry and agricultural methods implemented to increase productivity have led to the pollution of the Yangtze. However, the Chinese government has taken significant protective steps in this regard, one of which is the Yangtze River Protection Law, a unique law exclusively dedicated to the protection of the Yangtze. In this sense, I believe that analyzing this law is important in terms of its potential to serve as a model for countries in the Global South.

There are seven laws related to the environment in China.[iv] Although the Constitution holds a different place within the legal hierarchy, special laws also have practical application in their respective areas. In essence, Article 26 of the Constitution of China directly mandates state action to protect and improve the living and ecological environment. It requires pollution control, afforestation, and forest protection. This is the most direct article in the Constitution concerning the environment and represents the principle of “ecological civilization.” On the other hand, Article 22 of the Constitution, by stipulating the protection of sites of scenic and historic importance, combines environmental and cultural elements under the umbrella of national identity. Articles 9 and 10 also form the constitutional backbone of environmental protection.